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NOTES
MOTION PICTURE LICENSING ACTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THEIR PROVISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Since 1948, when distributors were required to divest themselves of
ownership of exhibition companies,' the distribution arm of the film
industry has become increasingly concentrated in several major com-
panies. 2 Conversely, exhibitors have remained substantially less con-
centrated. 3 In the competitive atmosphere ensuing from divestiture,
in which distributors license films to exhibitors by either bidding or
negotiation, 4 the bargaining power of distributors has grown dispro-
portionately to that of exhibitors,5 leading to a licensing system in
1. Divestiture was imposed to rectify antitrust abuses. United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd per curiam sub nom.
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 339 U.S. 974 (1950). The Supreme Court had affirmed
the finding of a New York district court that vertical monopolization in the movie
industry violated the Sherman Act. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 149-53 (1948). The Court remanded the case for appropriate relief. Id. at
178. On remand, the New York district court found divorcement of exhibitors and
distributors necessary to remedy the adverse effect vertical integration had on compe-
tition. 85 F. Supp. at 896. See generally M. Conant, Antitrust in the Motion Picture
Industry 84-106 (1960) (discussion of Paramount and its legal background); Cassady,
Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribution and Price Making,
31 S. Cal. L. Rev. 150, 152-53 (1958) (discussion of industry practices precipitating
Paramount).
2. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D. Ohio
1980), afJ'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Note,
Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture Industry, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1129 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Blind Bidding]; see Theater Owners Work to Ban Blind Bidding,
Bus. Wk., Apr. 17, 1978, at 40, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Theater Owners]. These
distributors include Allied Artists Pictures Corp., Avco Embassy Pictures Corp.,
Buena Vista Distribution Co., Columbia Pictures Industries, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Uni-
versal Film Exchanges, Inc., Warner Bros., Inc. and Warner Bros. Distributing
Corp. 496 F. Supp. at 413-14.
3. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aJ'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Cassady, supra note 1, at 150.
4. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 976 n.18
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
Bidding is a practice whereby a distributor notifies all exhibitors in a given area of a
forthcoming film and requests bids on suggested terms. 496 F. Supp. at 415. Negotia-
tion involves bargaining with individual theaters to arrive at mutually agreeable
terms. Id.
5. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 426 (S.D. Ohio
1980), af'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). The
imbalance has resulted from the combination of increased concentration of distribu-
tors in a few major companies while exhibitors have remained less concentrated, and
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which exhibitors generally accede to distributors' demands., For ex-
ample, exhibitors have been required to obligate themselves contrac-
tually prior to film completion, 7 and to make non-refundable pay-
ments on film rentals." Moreover, film distributors without
established reputations, known in the industry as "independents," 9
are often precluded from licensing films to the more desirable movie
theaters because the major distributors book those theaters months in
advance through blind bidding.' 0
Blind bidding requires exhibitors to bid for or negotiate a film
license without having an opportunity to view the film." Since the
expiration of an agreement between certain distributors and the
United States Department of Justice which had restricted blind bid-
ding to no more than three films per year per distributor, 12 blind
bidding has become the predominant practice in the movie industry.13
Nevertheless, certain distributors and exhibitors have recognized the
the unusually interdependent relationship between distributors and exhibitors. Id. at
413-14; see Cassady, supra note 1, at 150.
6. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 426 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
7. Blind Bidding At A Glance, Variety, Jan. 13, 1982, at 11 [hereinafter cited as
Blind Bidding At A Glance]; Heavens Gate Leaves Theater Owners Fuming, Bus.
Wk., Dec. 8, 1980, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Heavens Gate]; Theater Owners, supra
note 2, at 40.
8. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 418 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Ala. Code § 8-18-2 (Supp. 1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-3 (Purdon Supp. 1981-
1982); Utah Code Ann. § 13-13-2 (Supp. 1981); Heavens Gate, supra note 7, at 29.
9. Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at 1134.
10. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 433 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Blind
Bidding, supra note 2, at 1134; see Heavens Gate, supra note 7, at 29.
11. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 412 (S.D. Ohio
1980), afj'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Supreme Court has called this practice blind-selling. United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 n.11 (1948). When films are blind bid, bidders are
typically provided the names of principal actors, directors and a synopsis of the plot.
496 F. Supp. at 416.
12. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 416-17 & n.6 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Civ. No. 87-273 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 1968)), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.
1982). The period covered by this agreement, including extensions, was January 1,
1969 through January 1, 1975. Id.
13. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 416-17 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Blind Bidding for Movies is Attacked, UPI, Mar. 10, 1981 (available Mar. 12, 1981,
on LEXIS, Nexis library, Wire Services file) (95 % of all films shown in Colorado are
licensed through blind bidding); Theater Owners, supra note 2 (the nine top grossing
films of 1977 were licensed by blind bidding).
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problems created by blind bidding. 14 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the unfairness of this practice. 15
To alleviate inequitable practices in the motion picture industry,
twenty-two states have enacted motion picture licensing acts.16 The
acts are designed to promote informed decision-making and to estab-
lish fair and open bidding procedures, while also enhancing competi-
tion and preventing deceptive practices.' 7 Furthermore, the public
should benefit from anticipated lower admission prices' and reduced
exposure to objectionable films. 9
14. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 417 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
15. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 n.11 (1948).
The Court recognized that blind bidding is subject to abuse. Id.
16. Ala. Code §§ 8-18-1 to -6 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-1101 to -1106
(Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 106-1301 to -1305 (Supp. 1982); Idaho Code §§ 18-
7701 to -7708 (Supp. 1982); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 24-1-5-1 to -7 (Burns 1982); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 365.750-.765 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
37:2901-:2905 (West Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1901-05 (1980 &
Supp. 1981-1982); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93F, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); 1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1167 (Vernon); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-14-301 to -308
(1981); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-5A-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75C-1 to
-5 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.05-.07 (Page 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.890
(1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 39-5-510 to -560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 69-801 to
-804 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-13-1 to -7 (Supp. 1981); Va. Code §§ 59.1-
255 to -261 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.58.010-.050, .900-.905 (Supp.
1982); W. Va. Code §§ 47-11D-1 to -4 (1980). Alabama enacted the first motion
picture licensing act on April 27, 1978, see Ala. Code §§ 8-18-1 to -6 (Supp. 1979),
approximately three years after the agreement between certain distributors and the
Department of Justice had expired. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Puerto
Rico and Prince George County, Maryland have also enacted motion picture licens-
ing acts. Puerto Rico Regulation of Fair Competition Number VI, Jan. 21, 1980;
Prince George, Md., Ordinance CB-125-1981 (Nov. 3, 1981). Puerto Rico's regula-
tion requires that distributors have a trade screening and follow a prescribed bidding
procedure, which is similar to that designated in state acts. Puerto Rico Regulation of
Fair Competition No. VI, Jan. 21, 1980. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
The Prince George County act prohibits blind bidding and advances made more than
seven days prior to exhibition; it also requires a bidding procedure similar to that of
state acts. Prince George, Md., Ordinance CB-125-1981 (Nov. 3, 1981). See infra
note 79 and accompanying text. This Note focuses its discussion on the state acts.
17. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-3 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1101 (Supp.
1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-1301 (Supp. 1982); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-2
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
18. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 429 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). Some
evidence suggests that blind bidding drove theater owners to raise ticket prices. Id.;
see Debenport, Movie Bill Approved Despite Threat From 20th Century Fox, UPI,
Feb. 11, 1981 (available Feb. 13, 1981, on LEXIS, Nexis library, Wire Services file).
19. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 429 (S.D. Ohio
1980), affd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Blackmon, Bill to Get Sex and Nudity Off Screens Passed, UPI, Mar. 31, 1982
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The acts are commonly referred to as "anti-blind bidding ' 2 0 acts
because, although they vary, 2' each requires a distributor to trade
screen a film, that is, to show a film to interested exhibitors2 2 before
either entertaining bids or negotiating an exhibition license.23 Most
acts regulate the bidding procedure,2 4 and several acts prohibit guar-
antees and advances.2 5 Waivers of any provision are usually void.26
Under most acts, violation is a civil offense; 2 7 under a few, violation is
a misdemeanor. 28
Motion picture licensing acts have been criticized as an improper
and unwise governmental interference in the film industry. 29 Three
acts have been judicially challenged as unconstitutional3" on the
(available Apr. 2, 1982, on LEXIS, Nexis library, Wire Services file); Debenport,
supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Nicholson, Friendly & Newhall, Hollywood Roulette, Newsweek,
Jan. 4, 1982, at 57; Sick & Weary Blind Bid Impasse Persists: NATO Says Bans Don't
Dent Biz, Variety, Nov. 18, 1981, at 5; Tusher, Studios Boycott Anti-Blind Bid State
Locations, Variety, Apr. 15, 1981, at 1, 93.
21. The Pennsylvania act is the most expansive. It absolutely prohibits advances
and guarantees and limits the length of any exclusive first run to 42 days. Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). In contrast, the Georgia and
Tennessee acts only prohibit blind bidding. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 106-1301 to -1305
(Supp. 1982); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 69-801 to -804 (Supp. 1981).
22. E.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-2(9) (Supp. 1979); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-1303(i)
(Supp. 1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-1-5-1 (Burns 1982); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-5A-3.H
(Supp. 1982); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-3 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
23. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 106-1304 (Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.755
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:2903 (West 1982). See supra
note 16.
24. See infra note 79.
25. Idaho Code § 18-7704, -7706 (Supp. 1982) (advances and guarantees); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.755 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (advances and guarantees);
1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1170 (Vernon) (advances); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-305
(Supp. 1981) (guarantees); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.06 (Page 1979) (advances
and guarantees); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-5 to -6 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982)
(advances and guarantees); Utah Code Ann. § 13-13-4 (Supp. 1981) (guarantees).
26. E.g., Idaho Code § 18-7707 (Supp. 1982); Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-803(c)
(Supp. 1981); Va. Code § 59.1-258(c) (1982); Wash. 1hev. Code Ann. § 19.58.030(4)
(Supp. 1982).
27. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 106-1305 (Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.765
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75C-5 (1981).
28. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1105 (Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 18-7708 (Supp. 1982);
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 13-13-7
(Supp. 1981).
29. See Blind Bidding, supra note 2, passim.
30. Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981) (construing
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-13-1 to -7 (Supp. 1981)); Associated Film Distribution Corp.
v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (construing Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,
§§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982)), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d
Cir. 1982); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (construing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.05-.07 (Page 1979)), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
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grounds that they violate the commerce clause, 31 the first amend-
ment, 32 which is applicable to states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, 33 and the supremacy clause. 34 The acts have been defended as
31. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 1982)
(remanded case for determination of any commerce clause violation); Warner Bros.
v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Utah 1981) (found no violation of the
commerce clause); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp.
971, 991, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (without addressing the alleged commerce clause
violation, court held act unconstitutional), revd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d
Cir. 1982).
32. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirm-
ing lower court's holding that the statute did not violate the first amendment);
Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981) (found no
violation of first amendment); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh,
520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (district court held, on summary judgment, that
the act violated the first amendment), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1982).
33. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) ("[T]he conception of
liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the
right of free speech."); accord First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299-300 n.3 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
34. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirm-
ing lower court's holding that the act did not violate the supremacy clause); Warner
Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981) (held not preempted by the
Copyright Act); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp.
971, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (on summary judgment, district court held the act pre-
empted by the Copyright Act), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982). An
argument has been made that the acts violate antitrust laws. In Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. 3294 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] party may
successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its face
irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy." Id. at 3299. A motion picture
licensing act will thus be facially invalid "only if it mandates or authorizes conduct
that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places
irresistible pressure on a party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with
the statute .... [T]he conduct contemplated by the statute [must] in all cases [be] a
per se violation." Id. at 3300. In Allied Artists, the Ohio act was criticized as
violating federal antitrust laws and therefore preempted under the supremacy clause.
496 F. Supp. at 448. The alleged grounds of violation were encouragement of
product splitting, interference with independent pricing behavior and reduction of
competition among exhibitors. Id. at 448. Product splitting would occur if groups of
exhibitors within a geographical area agree to allocate available films among them-
selves, thereby assuring each exhibitor a film to exhibit at all times. Id. Product
splitting, however, requires collusion by exhibitors. The acts, as the Allied Artists
court found regarding the Ohio act, neither require nor authorize "collusive conduct
of any kind among exhibitors." Id. The acts do not interfere with independent
pricing. Although the additional information made available by the acts may be used
in a manner violative of antitrust laws, the open bidding following from the informa-
tion requirement does not affect licensing terms. Id. at 449-50. Additional acts not
authorized by these provisions are necessary before anti-competitive effects result
from interference with independent pricing behavior. Id. The dissemination of price
information is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. United States v. Citizens &
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being within the permissible scope of state action.35 This Note scruti-
nizes the constitutionality of the various provisions of the acts, and
concludes that all of the analyzed provisions are constitutional except
for a provision found in the Pennsylvania act 36 which limits the length
of exclusive first runs.3 7
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause grants Congress authority "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States."' 38 Despite the national
scope of film distribution, Congress has not regulated this area. Con-
gress thus either intended the area to remain unregulated or intended
it to be regulated locally.39 Logically, states are in a better position
than Congress to regulate film licensing. For example, the determina-
tion of where a trade screening should be held is based upon the
particularities of a locality and is therefore more effectively dealt with
on a state-by-state basis. 40 Motion picture licensing acts nevertheless
have been criticized as interfering with film exhibition licenses that
traverse state lines. 41 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,42 the Supreme
S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925). The acts do not reduce competition among exhibitors. In
fact, the acts foster competition. See infra pt. I(C)(3). The acts are thus not pre-
empted by the federal antitrust laws under the per se rule. Regarding invalidation
under the rule of reason, the Supreme Court has said that "[a]nalysis under the rule
of reason requires an examination of the circumstances underlying a particular
economic practice, and therefore does not lend itself to a conclusion that a statute is
facially inconsistent with federal antitrust laws." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102
S. Ct. 3294, 3300 (1982).
35. Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D. Utah 1981); Associ-
ated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 428-29 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other
grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
36. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
37. Id. § 203-7.
38. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5748 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. Congress
intended to leave the states free to propound law in the areas of privacy, publicity,
trade secrets, defamation and fraud, each of which affect and restrict the exercise of
copyright, so long as the causes of action concerning them contain elements that are
different from copyright infringement. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5748.
40. For example, in Virginia, where the theaters of several states are in proxim-
ity, the act permits trade screening in another state. Va. Code § 59.1-258 (1982).
41. See supra note 31.
42. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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Court set forth the test for determining the validity of state regulations
that burden interstate commerce:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. 43
State regulations thus may not discriminate against interstate com-
merce. 44 Motion picture licensing acts do not distinguish between in-
state and out-of-state distributors because the acts apply with equal
force to all distributors. 45 Although the commerce clause "limits the
power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade,"' 46 the
acts are valid if they foster an overriding legitimate state interest.47
Such validity is addressed after a brief discussion of first amendment
considerations.
B. The First Amendment
Motion pictures are protected by the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech48 applicable to the states through the fourteenth
43. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
44. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 39-44 (1980); City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). "Protectionist legislation," that is, state law that distin-
guishes for purely economic reasons between in-state and out-of-state products com-
peting at the same level, is deemed always to impose an excessive burden on interstate
commerce and is thus per se invalid. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-31
(1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); Buck v. Kuyken-
dall, 267 U.S. 307, 316 (1925).
45. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 437 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aJ'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Utah 1981).
46. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); see, e.g., Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 623 (1978); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949).
47. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1978). The Court has stated that legitimate public
interests include the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of a state. Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
48. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); see Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
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amendment. 49 The content of speech may not be regulated absent a
compelling state interest.5 0 Motion picture licensing acts do not, on
their face, regulate the content of speech. 51 They apply to all films
that are distributed, regardless of their content. Furthermore, the acts
do not have the effect of regulating content because in determining
whether there has been compliance, the content of the film is irrele-
vant.
52
The first amendment does not guarantee that freedom of speech
may be exercised regardless of other rights and interests.5 3 Time, place
and manner of speech may be regulated 54 if an important and sub-
stantial governmental interest is furthered, 55 and "the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." 56 The licensing acts
regulate the time, place and manner of film exhibition.
57
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). In the past, the Court made
narrow, categorical exceptions to first amendment protection for fighting words,
defamation and obscenity. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscen-
ity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). The Court, however, has eroded
these exceptions. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 12-17, at 670 (1978).
51. Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981); Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 432 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in
part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 1982).
52. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
53. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 282 (1951); L. Tribe, supra note 50, § 12-2, at 580.
54. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) ("[G]eneral regulatory
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the [First Amendment]
forbade ... the States to pass .. "); see, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 62-63 (1976); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951).
55. Time, place and manner restrictions are permissible if "they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . serve a significant
governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516
(1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). A Pennsylvania district court, while acknowledging the con-
tent-neutral nature of the Pennsylvania act, held that it violated the first amendment
because the restriction on free speech was more than necessary. Associated Film
Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 986-91 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd
and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
56. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The balancing test of
O'Brien originated in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), in which the Court
stated:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public conven-
ience . . . [are] insufficient to justify [regulation that] diminishes the exer-
cise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so,
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The first amendment test employs a balancing of the state interest
against the impingement upon the protected interest: The more im-
portant the state interest is, the greater the impingement on freedom
of speech may be.58
Although a general state interest-alleviation of inequitable licens-
ing practices-is sought to be furthered by motion picture licensing
acts, 5 each provision is designed to promote a specific state purpose. 60
A discussion of the validity of the individual provisions of the motion




The trade screening provision requires that a distributor provide an
opportunity for interested exhibitors to view a film before the distribu-
tor either solicits bids for or negotiates an exhibition license. 61 By
promoting informed decision-making, the provision encourages licens-
ing terms that reflect the actual quality of the film licensed. 62
The requirement burdens interstate commerce to the extent that it
delays the flow of films into a regulating state until a trade screening
occurs. 63 Distributors assert that compliance with the varying provi-
as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh
the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Id. at 161. In Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74-75 (1981), the Court made
clear that the state has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the state interest. Id.
There must be evidence that a need exists for the state regulation. Id.
57. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 432 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aJf'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
58. Id.
59. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1982);
see Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 978-79
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982). Various state
statutes enacted to encourage fair trade practices have been upheld as supporting
important, substantial and legitimate state interests. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
462 (1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-29 (1963); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949).
60. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-4 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). Compare Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 70-1101 (Supp. 1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-2(10) (Purdon Supp.
1981-1982) with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp. 1981).
61. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
62. See Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 1982);
see, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-3 (Supp. 1979); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:2901 (West
1982); Va. Code § 59.1-256 (1982).
63. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 438-39 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
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sions of the acts will render nationwide distribution unduly difficult. 4
Nationwide distribution will not be hampered,6 5 however, because all
acts have the trade screening requirement.6"
Freedom of speech is affected because a distributor may not com-
municate a film to the public without first providing a trade screen-
ing.67 This restriction may in some circumstances delay release.68
Because viewing audiences are seasonal,6 9 the timely release of a film
is critical in maximizing audience size. Moreover, successful advertis-
ing depends on timely release. 70
Although the mere threat of delay could constitute grounds for
invalidating a statute,71 the threat of delay created by trade screening
is not a serious one. Distributors can avoid delay by making accommo-
dations in the production schedule. 72 Moreover, any threat of delay is
outweighed by the important state interest in licensing films according
to actual quality. Trade screening removes the unfairness inherent in
64. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 435-37 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982);
National Ass'n of Theater Owners, A Position Paper 16 (Dec. 1981) (reprinting
Motion Pictures Licensing, published by the Motion Picture Association of America)
(available from the National Association of Theater Owners, New York, NY) [herein-
after cited as NATO].
65. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978). In
Exxon, the Court recognized that the evil feared by opponents to the state statutes
was "not that the several States will enact differing regulations, but rather that they
will all conclude that [the] provisions are warranted." Id.
66. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 421-23 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). In
Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa.
1981), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982), the district court found the
threatened delay sufficient to render the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 983. In
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Third Circuit ruled
that whether the acts threatened or resulted in delay was a question of fact for trial.
683 F.2d at 813-14.
69. See Blind Bidding At a Glance, supra note 7, at 11; Holiday Winners and
Losers, Time, Jan. 14, 1980, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Holiday Winners].
70. See NATO, supra note 64, at 5.
71. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965). In Freedman, a state
statute was held unconstitutional because it unduly delayed the exhibition of a film
while a state board reviewed it to determine if it was obscene. Id. at 60. A revised
version of the statute was upheld because the delay was not protracted. Star v.
Preller, 375 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Md.), af'd mem., 419 U.S. 956 (1974).
72. The producers and distributors determine the schedule necessary for timely
film release. See Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at 1132. The acts are unlike those
statutes held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in which delay might have
resulted from the arbitrary judgment of a local official or a lack of prompt judicial
review. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684-85
(1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
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blind bidding, which has been described as "buying a pig in a poke, '73
by giving exhibitors an opportunity to evaluate a film effectively
before deciding whether and on what terms to seek a license.7 4
The argument that the trade screening requirement is not the least
restrictive means75 of furthering the state interest is not valid. A trade
screening is a verifiable and non-arbitrary disclosure requirement.
The alternative of requiring distributors to supply information76 short
of a trade screening is inadequate because exhibitors would nonethe-
less be forced to imagine the final version of a film and to rely on a
distributor's ability to transform ideas into an effective film. 77 The




The provisions that regulate bidding typically specify the informa-
tion that must be contained in solicitations to bid, the persons that
must be allowed to attend bid openings and the information that must
be made available to bidders after bids are opened. 79 Most provisions
prohibit licensing by negotiation once bids have been solicited.80 The
73. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 1982)
(quoting lower court).
74. Id.
75. Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at 1133 (suggesting that increased disclosure
achieved by providing exhibitors with "access to scripts, lengthier synopses, or uned-
ited versions of ... films" would be sufficient).
76. Id.
77. Producers notoriously cut and splice films to accommodate their own whims,
as well as those of their particular audiences. Corliss, No, but I Saw the Rough Cut,
Time, Aug. 18, 1980, at 58; see Cruising Spurs a Test of Booking Films Blind, Bus.
Wk., Mar. 3, 1980, at 26.
78. Viewing a film is the best way to determine its quality. Some distributors
admit that blind bidding is an undesirable trade practice. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). But see Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at
1132.
79. See Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp. 1981);
Ind. Code §§ 24-1-5-4 to -6 (1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.760 (Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:2904 (West Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 10, § 1903 (1980); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93F § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); 1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1169-70 (Vernon); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-5A-5 (Supp.
1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75C-4 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.07 (Page 1979);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-8 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-530
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 13-13-5 (Supp. 1981); Va. Code §
59.1-259 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.58.040 (Supp. 1982); W. Va. Code §
47-11D-4 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp.




state interest sought to be furthered by these provisions is the promo-
tion of fair and open licensing procedures,8' by "counteract[ing] decep-
tion and unfair manipulation of the bidding process" and "prevent-
[ing] . . .misleading trade practice. 82
Compliance with the varying bidding procedures8 3 threatens to
burden interstate commerce by making it inconvenient for distribu-
tors to license films in more than one state. The bidding provisions
may prolong the licensing process and increase the cost of film distri-
bution . 4 Moreover, once bids are solicited, distributors may not li-
cense by negotiation. 5 These provisions thus limit the methods of
licensing available to a distributor.
Compliance, however, should not be difficult. Although not identi-
cal, all the provisions of the seventeen states that specify the bidding
procedure are very similar. 6 The information that distributors are
required to supply is readily accessible.87 Except for post-bidding
information, most of the required information had been supplied
routinely by distributors prior to legislation. 8 The post-bidding infor-
mation requirement, which includes supplying the name of the li-
81. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 663 (6th Cir. 1982).
Sixteen acts specify bidding procedure; all give distributors the option to negotiate.
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp. 1981);
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 24-1-5-4 to -6 (Burns 1982). Bidding, however, is widely used.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161-66 (1948); see Herman,
Blind Bids on Movies Defended by Valenti, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1980, at C21, col.
2.
82. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 663 (6th Cir. 1982).
Although referring to the purposes of the Ohio act, the district court noted that the
act is similar to other acts. 496 F. Supp. at 436.
83. See supra note 79.
84. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 423, 439 (S.D.
Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
85. See supra note 80.
86. See supra note 79. With the exception of Utah, all the provisions require that
invitations to bid specify whether the run for which bids are being solicited is the first
one, the geographic area of the run, the names of all exhibitors being solicited (except
Indiana), the expiration date of the invitation and the location of bid openings. With
the exception of Maine and Utah, the provisions also require that bids be in writing
and be opened in front of exhibitors present at the opening. With the exception of
Maine, Missouri and Utah, distributors must make bids available for examination
either immediately or within sixty days after bids are opened, and must notify
bidders of the winner. Five states require distributors to make the winning terms
available to bidders. Ten states prohibit negotiation once bidding is initiated. See id.
87. See supra note 86.
88. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 419-20, 423
(S.D. Ohio 1980), af-f'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.
1982); P. Baumgarten & D. Farber, Producing, Financing and Distributing Film 191
(1973).
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censed exhibitor and the winning terms,8 9 and making losing bids
available, 90 should not be difficult to comply with.
The burden of supplying such information is necessary to foster the
state interest in preventing deceptive practices through fair and open
licensing procedures. This information, coupled with the prohibition
against negotiation once bidding is initiated, prevents "five o'clock
look deals," which occur when distributors allow favored exhibitors to
top the highest bid. 91
Freedom of speech is restricted to some extent by the bidding
procedure because a distributor must comply with a designated proce-
dure to exhibit its film.92 Such compliance may delay distribution and
increase the cost of licensing films.9 3 Distributors contend that these
combined factors will diminish revenues, thereby ultimately reducing
the quality or quantity of films. 94
Distributors, having financial acumen, however, can be expected to
make every effort to avoid delays by allocating bidding time in the
initial production schedule.95 Any increase in cost will be minimal
because, as previously noted, most of the required information was
already routinely supplied by distributors. 96 The state interest in fair
and open licensing procedures outweighs this slight burden on free-
dom of speech. There is no less restrictive way to further fair and open
bidding procedures. A clearly delineated bidding procedure is needed
to verify compliance. The degree of disclosure required by the bidding
provisions is essential to the prevention of deceptive licensing prac-
tices.
89. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp.
1981); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-1-5-5 to -6 (Burns 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.760
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982). Exhibitors should be notified if no one won the contract.
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104 (Supp. 1981);
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-1-5-5 to -6 (Burns 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.760 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1982). Post-bidding information need only be supplied to bidding
exhibitors. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-18-5 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1104
(Supp. 1981); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-1-5-5 to -6 (Burns 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
365.760 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982).
90. See supra note 79.
91. An Ohio district court suggests that five o'clock look deals were common
before the act was passed. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408,
430 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir. 1982).
92. See supra note 79.
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94. NATO, supra note 64, at 12.
95. See supra note 72.
96. See supra note 88.
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3. Advances and Guarantees
As compensation for the leasing of a film, distributors customarily
receive a percentage of box office receipts, 97 and often receive ad-
vances and guarantees.98 An "advance" is a payment by a licensing
exhibitor made in anticipation of box office revenues.9 9 If the film
does not produce expected revenues, the payment is refunded.' °0 A
''guarantee" is a non-refundable payment that assures a minimum
return to a distributor should anticipated box office receipts not mate-
rialize.' 01
The restrictions on advances and guarantees are designed to pro-
mote competition and to protect exhibitors from unfair trade prac-
tices.102 These objectives are achieved by prohibiting practices that
developed as a result of the gross inequality of bargaining power both
between distributors and exhibitors, and among exhibitors. 0 3 Because
these restrictions impinge on freedom of speech and interstate com-
merce differently, separate discussion of advances and guarantees is
warranted.
97. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415, 418 (S.D.
Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
98. Id.
99. See Associated Film Distribution v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 976 n. 15
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
100. Brief for Appellee at 4, Allied.Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656
(6th Cir. 1982).
101. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 418 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
102. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 70-1101 (Supp. 1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-1301 (Supp.
1982); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-2 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
103. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The current imbalance in bar-
gaining power is a result of the unique structure of the film industry whereby
exhibitors compete both among themselves for the best movies and with distributors
for the best licensing arrangements. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F.
Supp. 408, 415 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982). It has been intensified by the decrease in the number of films
produced yearly, the increase in the number of theater screens and the vast number
of exhibitors as compared to the small number of major distributors. See Blind
Bidding, supra note 2, at 1129-30. Although none of the acts include balancing of
bargaining power within their express purposes, one district court found, and an-
other assumed for the purpose of summary judgment, that the acts are designed to
achieve this. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971,
979 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1982); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 429 (S.D. Ohio
1980), affd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Sixth Circuit and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have questioned whether
balancing the bargaining power constitutes a legitimate state interest. The lessening
of the inequality in the bargaining power in the motion picture industry, however, is
merely the consequence of prohibiting advances and guarantees; the purpose is the
promotion of competition and the prevention of unfair trade practices.
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a. Advances
Some acts prohibit the payment of advances more than fourteen
days prior to exhibition.10 4 This limitation should not appreciably
affect film exhibition because it is unusual for a distributor to require
an advance more than fourteen days prior to exhibition. 05 Other acts
absolutely prohibit the use of advances. 10 Because distributors have
used advances to prevent delinquent payments and to collect overdue
payments,10 7 these acts may reduce the certainty of payment provided
by advances. 08 Thus, interstate commerce may be burdened because
distributors will be discouraged from licensing in states that absolutely
prohibit advances.
The burden on interstate commerce is not substantial, however,
because advances are not necessary to ensure payment by exhibitors.
Distributors may avail themselves of state contract laws to redress any
nonpayment. 10 9 Moreover, exhibitors that fail to perform their con-
tractual duties risk not being granted licenses by distributors in the
future.
The provisions arguably threaten freedom of speech because fewer
films may be produced if investment is discouraged by the decreased
certainty of return. Moreover, if distributors are reluctant to rely on
the creditworthiness of exhibitors, films conceivably may not be ex-
hibited in states that absolutely prohibit advances." 0 Investment in
films should not be deterred, however, because advances are refund-
able." The prohibition against advances therefore does not increase
the risk to a distributor of a film's failure."2 Furthermore, the possi-
104. Missouri forbids an exhibitor from fowarding money to a distributor more
than fourteen days prior to film release. 1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1170 (Vernon).
Kentucky and Ohio forbid a distributor from conditioning a license on an exhibitor's
advancing money more than fourteen days prior to exhibition. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 365.755(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.06(c) (Page
1979).
105. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 420 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
106. Idaho Code § 18-7706 (Supp. 1982); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-6 (Purdon
Supp. 1981-1982).
107. See Bennett, Getting Movies Into Theaters: The Distribution Biz Made Sim-
ple, Soho Weekly News, Aug. 30, 1979, at 37, col. 1.
108. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 985
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding that the act, on its face,
shifts the financial burden. Such an issue is a question of fact that must be deter-
mined at trial. 683 F.2d at 812.
109. See Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("Princi-
ples of contract law are generally applicable in the construction of copyright assign-
ments, licenses and other transfers of rights." (footnote omitted)).
110. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 100.
112. Additionally, any increase in the cost of producing a film created by a slight
delay in the return of capital would be negligible compared with total production
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bility that films will not be exhibited in states that prohibit advances is
remote because distributors are not likely to forego an entire geo-
graphic viewing audience.
Consequently, the burden caused by prohibiting advances is slight
and is outweighed by the importance of promoting competition and
preventing unfair trade practices. There is no less restrictive way to
further this interest. Absent an absolute prohibition on advances,
those exhibitors that are financially able to make advances will proba-
bly continue to do so voluntarily, thus frustrating the state's pur-
pose. 113
b. Guarantees
Only those distributors that receive a percentage of box office re-
ceipts are subject to provisions that restrict the use of guarantees. 4
There are two types of guarantee provisions. The first type, which
prohibits distributors from conditioning the extension of a license on a
guarantee," 5 should not affect a distributor's ability to obtain guaran-
tees. Although this type of provision prohibits distributors from asking
for a guarantee, it does not prohibit exhibitors from offering one.
Fierce competition among exhibitors1 6 will induce those exhibitors
that have the financial means to succumb to a distributor's demand
for a guarantee, to volunteer one.1 7
The second type of provision absolutely prohibits the use of guaran-
tees."" This prohibition burdens interstate commerce because it may
costs. For example, the cost of "The Black Hole," a Walt Disney movie, was $25
million. Hollywood Roulette, supra note 20, at 57. "1941" cost nearly $40 million to
make; "Star Trek" cost $50 million including promotion. Holiday Winners, supra
note 69, at 55. In 1979, the average film production cost was $17 million. Herman,
supra note 81, at C21, col. 2.
113. See Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at 1130.
114. Idaho Code § 18-7704 (Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.755 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-305 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1333.06 (Page 1979); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-5 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Utah
Code Ann. § 13-13-4 (Supp. 1981).
115. See Idaho Code § 18-7704 (Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.755
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.06 (Page 1979); Utah Code
Ann. § 13-13-4 (Supp. 1981). An Ohio district court has interpreted this provision to
permit exhibitors to offer guarantees. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F.
Supp. 408, 445 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982). Because distributors may continue to reject all bids, it appears
unlikely that these acts will deter the use of guarantees in licensing films. See infra
note 116-17 and accompanying text.
116. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 429 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Bennett supra note 107, at 37, col. 1.
117. Why Do Exhibs Voluntebr Such Hefty Guarantees?, Variety, Feb. 7, 1979, at
5, col. 2; see Bennett, supra note 107, at 37, col. 1.
118. Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-305 (1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-1-5
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
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deter some distributors from licensing exhibitors in states with such
provisions. Because distributors use guarantees to shift part of the
financial risk of a film's failure to exhibitors," 9 the prohibition of this
practice increases the financial risk for those distributors that would
otherwise receive a guarantee. 12 0 Such increase in financial risk also
threatens freedom of speech because it may reduce the number of
films produced. 12
To minimize any increased risk, however, distributors probably
will demand an increased percentage of the box office receipts. 12 2
Moreover, if guarantees are absolutely prohibited in an entire state,
distributors may be more amenable to licensing small exhibitors that
are unable to make guarantees. 123 The number of viewers may thus in
fact increase.
119. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 418 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
120. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 423-24 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
121. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 985-86
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
The number of films produced annually has been declining. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 435 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). A more rapid decline does not necessar-
ily follow simply because a form of compensation is disallowed. See id.
122. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 423-24 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); see
Blind Bidding, supra note 2, at 1134 & n.24. Both the Sixth Circuit and a Pennsylva-
nia district court viewed this prohibition on guarantees as permitting exhibitors to
escape sharing in the risks inherent in the movie industry. Allied Artists Picture Corp.
v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 664 (6th Cir. 1982); Associated Films Distribution Corp. v.
Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 983-85 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 683
F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982). An exhibitor is still subject to these risks, however, because
if a film is unsuccessful, any share to which the exhibitor is entitled is reduced.
123. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy of protecting small
businesses. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978);
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); American Motors Sales Corp.
v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836
(1979). The state statutes upheld in these cases, however, were contested soley on
commerce clause grounds. Statutes prohibiting practices that increase the costs of
exercising first amendment rights have been upheld. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding federal regulation of the broadcasting
industry); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding ordinance prohibit-
ing the solicitation of goods at private residences); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (upholding the prohibition of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 against publishing discriminatory notices relating to sale or
rental of dwellings). The unique structure of the movie industry, along with the
interdependency of distributors and exhibitors, requires regulation of their conduct.
Similar regulations in similarly structured industries have been upheld. This is partic-
ularly true in the motor vehicle industry. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin
W. Fox. Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (due process challenge of state statute regulating
retail automobile dealerships); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor
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The burden on interstate commerce and the free exercise of speech
is outweighed by the state interest in fostering competition. This state
interest cannot be furthered in a way less restrictive than an absolute
prohibition. Without such a prohibition, financially able exhibitors
would probably volunteer guarantees, thereby defeating the state
interest. 12 4
4. Exclusive First Runs
The Pennsylvania act prohibits exclusive first runs of motion pic-
tures for more than forty-two days "without provision to expand the
run to second run or subsequent run theatres within the geographical
area."12 5 The state interest sought to be furthered by this provision-
the promotion of broad dissemination of information 12 6-is legiti-
mate, important and substantial. 27
Prior to licensing, distributors generally consider several economic
and aesthetic factors in determining whether a theater is suitable for
film exhibition. These factors include grossing capacity, theater image
and location. 28 Moreover, the screen quality and acoustics of a the-
ater are important in creating the optimal atmosphere.
The exclusive licensing provision requires distributors to license
surrounding theaters 2 9 after the statutory period for exclusive first
runs has expired. 30 If there are other suitable theaters in the area, the
number of viewers may increase. '3' Broader dissemination of informa-
Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 836 (1979) (commerce clause
challenge of state regulation of automobile dealership franchises). The Supreme
Court upheld a Maryland statute that required gasoline distributors to extend a
"voluntary allowance" to all retail stations supplied in the state. Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 119-20 (1978). A voluntary allowance is a temporary
price reduction "granted by the oil companies to independent dealers who are injured
by local competitive price reductions of competing retailers." Id. at 122-23. The
purpose of the voluntary allowance provision, the promotion of competition among
retailers, is the same as that of the advance and guarantee provisions.
124. See supra note 117.
125. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-7 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
126. Id. § 203-2(4).
127. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Lamont v. Post-
master Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
128. P. Baumgarten & D. Farber, supra note 88, at 191-92; Murphy, What Does
Average Per Screen Mean?, Variety, July 7, 1982, at 1; Bennett, supra note 107, at
37, col. 1.
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. The geographic area referred to
in the Pennsylvania act is assumed to be the competitive zone in which several
exhibitors vie for the same audience. See P. Baumgarten & D. Farber, supra note 88,
at 193.
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131. For example, subsequently licensed theaters may be more conveniently lo-
cated or may charge lower admission prices.
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tion may thus be achieved. If, however, there are no other suitable
theaters, distributors may opt not to undergo the expense of making
an additional film print, 32 thus limiting a film's exhibition in a partic-
ular geographic area to the statutory period. 33 A Pennsylvania district
court determined that the provision "creates the risk that exhibition of
a given motion picture might not take place for a period of time
sufficient to make it economically worthwhile."'' 34 The court invali-
dated the act on first amendment grounds and deemed it unnecessary
to discuss the commerce clause. 35
Interstate commerce is burdened because, in areas where no other
suitable theaters exist, licensing is interrupted upon expiration of the
statutory period. 36 Freedom of speech is similarly burdened because
films will be exhibited for a shorter period in those areas.' 37 Although
the state interest in broad dissemination of information is impor-
tant, 38 this provision is not properly designed to achieve it. The
limitation on exclusive first runs actually may decrease the dissemina-
tion of information. The burden being excessive, the exclusive license
provision violates both the commerce clause and the first amendment.
II. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Motion pictures are entitled to protection 39 under the Copyright
Act of 1976,140 which Congress enacted pursuant to its constitutional
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." ' 4 The "bundle of
rights" known as copyright 42 confers upon the owner of a copyrighted
132. See P. Baumgarten & D. Farber, supra note 88, at 190.
133. The exhibitors who win a bid for the first exclusive runs would also be
harmed because their revenues will be reduced commensurate with the reduction in
the length of their exclusive run. See Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thorn-
burgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 985 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and re-
manded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
134. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 985
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
135. Id. at 991.
136. See Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971,
985 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1982).
137. See id. at 985-86.
138. See supra note 127.
139. "Copyright protection subsists .. .in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression .... Works of authorship include . . .motion
pictures ...." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
140. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (Supp. IV 1980)).
141. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142. House Report, supra note 39, at 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5674; see Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 417 n. 13 (1949)
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motion picture the exclusive right, among others, to distribute copies
and to perform the work publicly.1 43 A copyright is granted by Con-
gress and cannot be vitiated by the states.144 Motion picture licensing
acts are invalid if they are either explicitly or implicitly preempted 45
by the Copyright Act.
A. Explicit Preemption
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts only those "legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106." 146 It
expressly leaves untouched the validity of those "rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to ...
activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 63 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946)); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No.
81-1687).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. IV 1980). Additionally, this section grants a copy-
right owner the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works
and display the copyrighted work publicly. Id. The 1909 Act granted the copyright
owner the right "to vend." Such right did not confer the right to transfer works at all
times and at all places free and clear of all claims of others. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621
F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). It simply gave the artist
"the exclusive right to transfer the title for a consideration to others." Bauer v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913). The legislative history of § 106 of the 1976 Act does
not indicate that Congress intended to broaden the scope of this exclusive right to
transfer to include transfer at all times and at all places. See House Report, supra
note 39, at 61-65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5674-78.
144. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
145. Federal preemption of state legislation rests on two established grounds: a
finding that Congress has chosen to completely occupy a field or a finding that the
state law conflicts with a valid federal statute. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
The intent of Congress is crucial in determining whether a field is so completely
occupied. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1975). Even absent
complete congressional occupation, federal laws override state laws with which they
conflict. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1274 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979). State law is preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). If reconcilable, however, state and federal statutes should coexist.
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2128-29 (1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. IV 1980). If Congress had intended to preempt the
entire field of copyright, a wide variety of laws that traditionally have been within
the states' purview would be nullified. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S.
257, 262 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
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any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106." 147 Essentially, the Copyright Act preempts
only those state laws that provide the same protection that is already
afforded by a copyright. 4 Thus, state-created rights not violable by
the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display are
not equivalent to copyright.149
Motion picture licensing acts have been criticized as creating rights
equivalent to a copyright owner's right to distribute. 50 These acts,
however, do not create a right equivalent to copyright. They are
violated only if distribution is coupled with one of the following:
distribution not preceded by a trade screening; 15' distribution not in
accordance with applicable bidding procedure; 152 or distribution ei-
ther preceded or accompanied by an advance or guarantee. 153 The
provisions thus regulate the manner in which the right to distribute is
exercised. Such economic regulations imposed on the exercise of the
right to distribute are valid.154
147. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress intended to leave the states
free to propound law in the areas of privacy, publicity, trade secret, defamation and
fraud. House Report, supra note 39, at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5747-48.
148. House Report, supra note 39, at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5746; Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1107,
1108 (1977); Note, The Fine Art of Preemption: Section 301 and the Copyright Act of
1976, 60 Or. L. Rev. 287, 287-88 (1981). "As long as a work fits within one of the
general subject matter categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States
from protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is
too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the
public domain." House Report, supra note 39, at 131, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 5747; accord Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 501
F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
149. 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B], at 1-11. These are the rights
the Copyright Act provides exclusively to the copyright owner. See supra note 143
and accompanying text. For a discussion on federal exemptions from copyright
violation, see infra note 199 and accompanying text.
150. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 991,
993-94 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1982); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 441, 445 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
151. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 104, 106, 115 & 118 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) (state application of antitrust
laws to marketing copyrighted materials); Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932)
(state may impose gross receipts tax on federally copyrighted film); Morseburg v.
Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir.) (California Resale Royalties Act not preempted
by the 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). People v. M & R
Records, Inc., 106 Misc. 2d 1052, 1057, 432 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849 (Crim. Ct. 1980)
(statute prohibiting sale of record that does not disclose name of manufacturer and
performer not preempted by § 301). Although the Pennsylvania act was held pre-
1982] 313
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
B. Implicit Preemption
Motion picture licensing acts are implicitly preempted if they con-
flict 155 with Congress' purposes in enacting the Copyright Act. 56 The
Copyright Act was enacted to further the basic constitutional aim of
promoting writing and scholarship. 157 Congress has determined that
writing and scholarship are best promoted by a uniform system of
copyright. 158
1. Promotion of Writing and Scholarship
The promotion of writing and scholarship is the paramount purpose
of the Copyright Act. 159 Because the costs of making films are high, 60
the ability of a filmmaker to attract investors is essential to the
achievement of this purpose. Although licensing terms between dis-
tributors and exhibitors may be affected by the licensing acts, the
empted under the supremacy clause in Associated Film, the court did not base its
holding on § 301. 520 F. Supp. at 993. The Ohio and Utah district courts held that
their respective state acts were not preempted by § 301. Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson,
533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F.
Supp. 408, 432-33 (S.D. Ohio 1980), af'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679
F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
155. In Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983
(1980), the court said " '[c]onflict' . . . can require no more than a mechanical
demonstration of potential conflict between federal and state law to no less than a
showing of substantial frustration of an important purpose of the federal law by the
challenged state law." Id. at 976.
156. The determinative issue is "whether, under the circumstances of this particu-
lar case, [the state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941); accord Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977). The Supreme
Court has upheld state regulation of patent licensing. See, e.g., Patterson v. Ken-
tucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508 (1878). Notably, the intellectual right one owns in a patent is
more expansive than in a copyright. Goldstein, supra note 148, at 1108-09. The
patent creates a monopoly over non-obvious and novel ideas. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103
(1976). In comparison, the copyright creates a monopoly over the expression of the
idea. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 149, § 203[D], at 2-32.
157. House Report, supra note 39, at 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5745.
158. Id. "One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to promote
national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforc-
ing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the
various States." Id.; accord Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp.
408, 442 n. 18 (S.D. Ohio 1980), af'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982). See generally 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 149, § 1.01[B] (impact of
Copyright Act on state law). To promote uniformity, therefore, Congress has or-
dained that a single federal system, exclusive of all others, should reign.
159. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 149, § 1.03, at 1-30; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
ci. 8.
160. See supra note 112.
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primary criteria financiers consider in deciding whether to invest in a
film-the director, the actors and the plot-are not affected.' 61 Addi-
tionally, licensing agreements are usually made after financiers have
committed themselves to invest. 162 The acts should therefore have
little influence on investment decisions.
The acts may in fact promote writing and scholarship. Indepen-
dents, who are often precluded from licensing films to the better
exhibitors,16 3 will have a greater opportunity to do so because the acts
augment a competitive atmosphere, 16 4 thereby encouraging the crea-
tion of quality films.
2. Uniformity
Copyright essentially creates a monopoly over the commercial ex-
ploitation' 6 5 of a film for a limited period of time.'6 6 Because states
must recognize the rights subsumed in copyright, 16 7 motion picture
licensing acts may not conflict with the exercise of this monopoly.
Concern has been expressed regarding the effect the varying acts will
have on nationwide film distribution."' The acts, however, are not so
dissimilar as to retard such distribution. 16 For example, the Ohio
act, 170 which is one of the more stringent ones,' 7 ' was found to have
only a slight burden on nationwide advertising and promotion. 172
161. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 434 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
162. See id.
163. See supra note 10.
164. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
165. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-56 (1975); see
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1962); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 217 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 228 (1939).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1980); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
168. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 435-37 (S.D. Ohio
1980), affd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982);
NATO, supra note 64, at 16. Distributors claim that the long term result of added
costs and lost revenues due to delay in nationwide film distribution will be "fewer
films of lesser quality." Id.
169. See supra note 16. All acts prohibit blind bidding, see supra note 23, sixteen
acts specify the bidding procedure, see supra note 79, six acts regulate the use of
guarantees, see supra note 25, and four acts regulate the use of advances. See supra
note 25. Only the Pennsylvania act limits the length of an exclusive license. Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 73, § 203-7 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
170. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.05-.07 (Page 1979).
171. The Pennsylvania act is the only more stringent act. Compare Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1333.05-.07 (Page 1979) with Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
172. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 436-39 (S.D.
Ohio 1980), af'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Congress did not intend the uniformity of copyright to prevent a
state from attending to the particular needs of its residents through
economic regulation. 173 The acts, however, must not prevent1 74 the
exercise of rights afforded under copyright law. Because individual
provisions affect different rights afforded under copyright, separate
discussion of each provision is warranted.
a. Trade Screening
The provisions that require trade screening 175 have been challenged
on the ground that a trade screening forces a distributor to perform a
film publicly, 76 while the Copyright Act provides a copyright owner
with the right to choose whether or not to perform. 77 The perform-
ance, however, is not forced upon the distributor. The trade screening
requirement only applies to those distributors that have already volun-
tarily decided to perform.1 78 The performance merely takes place
slightly sooner than anticipated because distributors must trade screen
a film to exhibitors before entertaining bids or negotiating. 7 9
173. The Constitution does not give the federal government exclusive jurisdiction
over copyright. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973). In upholding
Utah's act, a district court recognized that "[s]tates may restrict the forms of enforce-
able agreements that private parties may enter into through contract law embodied
in statutes." Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981);
accord Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Tex. 1978); see, e.g.,
Gordon v. Vincent Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 271 (2d Cir. 1965); Clark v. West,
137 A.D. 23, 122 N.Y.S. 380 (1910), aff'd, 201 N.Y. 569, 95 N.E. 1125 (1911).
174. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 23.
176. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 445-46 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). A
trade screening is a performance. See id. at 447. It also constitutes publication of the
film because it is given with intent toward further distribution. Without a trade
screening, publication would occur after licensing. Under the Copyright Act of 1909,
copyright vested upon publication and state common law protected the author until
then. House Report, supra note 39, at 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5745; 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 149, § 1.01[A], at 1-3. Hence, a trade
screening would have triggered copyright protection. Under the 1976 Act, however,
copyright vests upon creation of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1980). The date
of publication thus does not affect the timing of copyright protection.
177. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see 17 U.S.C. § 106
(Supp. IV 1980). "Copyright is a right exercised by the owner during the term at his
pleasure . . . ." 286 U.S. at 130; accord Building Officials & Code Adm. v. Code
Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734-35 (1st Cir. 1980).
178. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 447 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
179. See supra note 23.
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b. Bidding Method
Provisions that prescribe bidding procedures do not conflict with
the right to distribute. °80 Although transfers that violate these provi-
sions may be voidable,'8 distributors are free to distribute either by
bidding in accordance with the applicable procedure or by negotiat-
ing.182
c. Advances and Guarantees
Copyright owners are entitled to rewards generated from the exer-
cise of their copyright.18 3 The Supreme Court, however, has stated
that reward is a secondary consideration: 8 4 "[T]he reward does not
serve its public purpose if it is not related to the quality of the
copyright."1 15 A copyright owner is not entitled to maximize the
reward irrespective of applicable state law. 88
Provisions that prohibit advances and guarantees 8 7 may affect the
reward of a copyright owner. 8 Prohibiting distributors from receiv-
ing advances8 9 may delay receipt of compensation for a short period
of time. The type of compensation distributors will receive, however,
remains unaffected. Prohibiting distributors from receiving'9" or, as
under other provisions, from requesting,' 9' a guarantee may change
the type of compensation a distributor receives. Distributors, how-
ever, may request either a percentage of box office receipts or a flat
180. See Warner Bros. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981). The
court said that copyright "has never encompassed a right to transfer the work at all
times and at all places free and clear of all regulation; it has meant that the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to transfer the material for a consideration to others."
Id. In summarily condemning the Pennsylvania act, a Pennsylvania district court
found that the bidding requirements restrict the distributor's control and freedom to
license. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 995
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
181. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.755(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.06(D) (Page 1979).
182. See supra note 81.
183. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Congress determined that pecu-
niary reward is the best method of promoting the arts. Id. This is implemented by
granting the copyright owner a monopoly for a limited amount of time. See supra
notes 165-66.
184. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
185. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
186. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 404 (1941).
187. See supra note 25.
188. See supra notes 108, 120 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 25.
190. See supra note 118.
191. See supra note 115.
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fee. 9 2 This choice has been denounced by distributors as a Hobson's
choice. 193 Because a trade screening is required before licensing, 94
however, a distributor has more information about the quality of a
film upon which to base its decision. Exhibitors will similarly have
more information about the quality of a film and can thus better
decide whether to include, if permissible, a guarantee in a bid for a
film. 195 The guarantee provision, like the advance provision, does not
conflict with the right to reap rewards from copyright. Both provi-
sions merely prevent distributors from shifting to exhibitors the risk of
failure of a film while simultaneously retaining the benefits of success.
d. Limit on Exclusive Licenses
The provision of the Pennsylvania act that prohibits exclusive li-
censing for more than forty-two days 96 violates the monopoly fea-
ture 97 of copyright. The Copyright Act grants a copyright owner the
right to license exclusively for a specified number of years.19 With the
exception of this Pennsylvania provision, this right is limited only by
sections 107-118 of the Copyright Act. 9 Compulsory licenses, for
example, are included within these limitations.20 0 The Pennsylvania
provision creates a compulsory license because, after forty-two days,
distributors are forced to license films to neighboring exhibitors. 20 1
This conflicts with the right to distribute because Congress has set
forth the only circumstances under which compulsory licenses must be
granted. 20 2 The restriction on exclusive licenses thus constitutes invalid
state action. 20 3
192. See supra note 114.
193. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 445 (S.D. Ohio
1980), af-'d in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
Compare 496 F. Supp. at 445 (Ohio act does not create a Hobson's choice) with
Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 994 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (Pennsylvania's act, which absolutely prohibits guarantees, creates a Hobson's
choice), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
194. See supra note 23.
195. See supra note 114.
196. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
198. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (Supp. IV 1980). Copyright in a work created on or
after January 1, 1978 generally endures for the life of the author plus 50 years. Id.
§ 302.
199. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (Supp. IV 1980). Such limitations include fair use,
reproductions by libraries and archives, certain secondary transmissions, ephemeral
recordings and compulsory licenses for making and distributing phonorecords. Id.
200. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115-116, 118 (Supp. IV 1980). A copyright holder nor-
mally has the option of licensing to whomever he chooses. Under certain circum-
stances delineated in these sections of the Copyright Act, the copyright owner must
grant a license to anyone requesting one. See id.
201. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 203-7 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
202. See supra note 200.
203. See Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D. Neb.
1944), afJ'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1947). In
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CONCLUSION
In the motion picture industry, the bargaining power of distributors
far exceeds that of exhibitors. Motion picture licensing acts have been
enacted as a response to abusive film distribution practices. By prohib-
iting blind bidding, the acts promote the licensing of films according
to quality. When supplemented by regulation of bidding procedures
and restrictions on advances and guarantees, the acts promote fair and
open dealing in a competitive atmosphere. The demonstrated value of
motion picture licensing acts in alleviating inequities in film distribu-
tion provides the states with ample incentive to enact them.
Mary Elizabeth Kilgannon
Remick, a state statute regulating sheet music distribution was invalidated because it
was found to deprive copyright owners of their right to control public performance of
their copyrighted musical compositions for profit. Id. at 543-45. Under the Nebraska
statute, if the copyright owner did not offer the public performance rights to the
sheet music purchaser, any such purchaser could have the work publicly performed
without any liability to the copyright owner. Id. at 543. Unlike the statute in
Remick, the exclusive license provision does not permit potential licensees to show the
film without liability to the distributor. Similar to the statute in Remick, however, it
deprives the copyright owner of the right to control the public performance of
motion pictures.
1982]
